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CONSUMER PROTECTION OUT OF THE 
SHADOWS OF SHADOW BANKING: THE ROLE 
OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU 
David Reiss* 
Consumer protection remains the stepchild of financial regulation. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the economic doldrums we find ourselves in 
originated in the under-regulated subprime mortgage sector, relatively few 
academic commentators focus on the role that consumer protection can play 
in reducing such risks as well as in restoring the balance between consumer 
and producer in the financial markets. This essay suggests that consumer 
protection regulation has an important role to play in the regulatory 
structure of the shadow banking sector. 
This essay does four things. First, it describes the role of shadow 
banking in the residential mortgage market—the shadow mortgage banking 
sector, as it were. Second, it contrasts two mortgages: one is emblematic of 
shadow mortgage banking during the Subprime Boom and the other is 
Dodd-Frank’s response to the excesses of the Subprime Boom—the 
“Qualified Mortgage.” It then evaluates whether Qualified Mortgages can 
restrain some of shadow mortgage banking’s excesses, and finds that they 
may be able to do so. It concludes by reviewing the first steps taken by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as it begins implementing Dodd-
Frank’s mortgage-related provisions. 
I. SHADOW MORTGAGE BANKING 
The shadow mortgage banking system dwarfs the banking system’s role 
in the residential mortgage markets.1 A key component of the shadow 
banking2 system is the securitization of credit,3 particularly of residential 
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 1. Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins 31 (Aug. 23, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816. 
 2. I use here Professor Schwarcz’s broad definition of shadow banks: “non-banks [that] 
provide financial products and services.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 621 (2012). Others prefer more limited definitions. See, e.g., Zoltan 
Pozsar, et al., Shadow Banking, 2012 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT No. 458, at 
abstract, available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf (defining shadow 
banks as “financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation 
without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees”) (Staff Report No. 
458); Bernard S. Sharfman, Using the Law to Reduce Systemic Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 609 n.8 
(2011) (defining shadow banking as “unregulated financial intermediation” (quoting Alessio M. 
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mortgages.4 However, shadow banking institutions that originated 
residential mortgages, particularly subprime mortgages, were much less 
regulated than banking institutions that had the same line of business.5 As a 
result, they were less constrained by consumer protection regulations.6 They 
were also able to lower their underwriting standards in order to increase 
their market share.7 
This weaker underwriting could be seen in the proliferation of exotic 
mortgage products that 
(i) did not require a down payment; 
(ii) allowed for negative amortization;8 and 
(iii) had no-doc verification of income and assets for underwriting 
purposes—the notorious “liar loan.”9 
These exotic mortgages allowed lenders to lend to many borrowers who did 
not have the credit profile of the traditional prime borrower.10 
Secondary market shadow bankers encouraged this phenomenon 
partially because a bigger consumer pipeline meant more mortgage-backed 
                                                                                                                 
Pacces, The Role and the Future of Regulation in the Financial Crisis: The Uncertainty 
Perspective 6 (Feb. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1551266)). 
 3. Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 622 n.12 (“[A] large part of what is considered in today’s 
markets to be structured finance involves securitization.” (quoting Henry A. Davis, The Definition 
of Structured Finance: Results from a Survey, 11 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 5, 7 (2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 4. See Tobias Adrian, Dodd-Frank One Year on: Implications of Shadow Banking, 2011 FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT No. 533, 1, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org 
/research/staff_reports/sr533.pdf. 
 5. See David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory 
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 997 (2006) 
[hereinafter Reiss, Subprime Standardization]; see also Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 
Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 
261, 261. 
 6. See Reiss, Subprime Standardization, supra note 5, at 997; see also Gorton & Metrick, 
supra note 5, at 261; Jason Hsu & Max Moroz, Shadow Banks and the Financial Crisis of 2007–
2008, in THE BANKING CRISIS HANDBOOK 39, 45 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2010). Additionally, 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found that shadow banking includes many “bank-like 
financial activities that are conducted outside the traditional commercial banking system, many of 
which are unregulated or lightly regulated.” Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 623 (quoting FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SHADOW BANKING AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 7 (May 4, 2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media 
/fcic-reports/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf).  
 7. See Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore 
Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155, 158 (2012). 
 8. ADRIAN, supra note 4. “‘Negative amortization’ refers to loans for which the principal 
amount of the loan increases . . . over the term of the loan” despite timely payments by the 
borrower. Reiss, Subprime Standardization, supra note 5, at 1027.  
 9. KATHLEEN ENGEL & PATRICIA MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 36 (2011).  
 10. See Gerding, supra note 1, at 30.  
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securities underwriting and, thus, more fees.11 But they also encouraged 
looser underwriting standards because subprime mortgages could generate 
higher profits than comparable prime mortgages due to their significantly 
higher interest rates and more opaque pricing.12 
During the early 2000s, the shadow mortgage banking sector appeared 
to excel at providing inexpensive funding by taking illiquid and, in some 
cases, risky and confusing individual mortgages and converting them into 
liquid, investment grade, fungible securities.13 But while the shadow 
mortgage banking sector appeared to convert illiquid mortgages into liquid 
investments, it in fact did the opposite by “fund[ing] illiquid assets with 
short-term liabilities,” creating a liquidity mismatch that is exposed to runs 
in the commercial paper and other short-term lending markets, much like 
the bank runs of earlier eras.14 Because that process of securitization was 
built on a faulty foundation, it contributed in no small part to the Subprime 
Boom and Bust.15 
The systemic problem with the subprime sector’s origination practices 
was not just that they were originating mortgages that were more likely to 
default.16 Underwriting standards for securitized pools can address this 
concern if the higher rates of default are predictable.17 The thornier 
problem, from a mortgage-backed securities underwriting perspective, is 
that market participants did not understand how risky those mortgages were 
and how rapidly the risk profile of mortgage products originated by many 
shadow banking institutions changed.18 In other words, underwriters and 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of 
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1366–67 (2009). 
 12. Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 123, 126, 140–43 (2007).  
 13. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 11–12.  
 14. Hsu & Moroz, supra note 6, at 45. A “bank run” occurs when a bank’s depositors 
withdraw their deposits from a bank because they fear it is insolvent. Id. at 42–43. Because banks 
keep only a small percentage of their deposits on hand, a bank run can ruin even a healthy bank. 
See Fred Galves, Might Does Not Make Right: The Call for Reform of the Federal Government’s 
D’Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) Superpowers in Failed Bank Litigation, 80 MINN. L. 
REV. 1323, 1339 n.66 (1996) (citing THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 
171 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992)). 
 15. See Hsu & Moroz, supra note 6, at 45, 48–55 (describing the role of shadow banking in the 
2008–2009 financial crisis). 
 16. Kristopher S. Gerardi et al., Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis, 2009 FED. RES. BANK 
OF BOS. PUB. POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPERS 09-1, 7, available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic 
/ppdp/2009/ppdp0901.pdf (“Loans originated with less than complete documentation of income or 
assets, and particularly those originated with both high leverage and incomplete documentation, 
exhibited sharper rises in defaults than other loans.”). 
 17. See id. at 2 (suggesting that the ability to accurately predict rates of default would have 
helped to curb lax underwriting and rating standards leading up to the subprime credit boom).  
 18. See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 3; Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 632, 634–35; see also 
Tobias Adrian & Adam M. Ashcraft, Shadow Banking Regulation, 2012 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 
STAFF REPORT No. 559, 7–8, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043153 (likening the 
breakdown of reliable creditworthiness information to a “game of telephone” where each step of 
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rating agencies had no baseline from which they could establish reliable 
default rates for all of the new products that were originated during the 
Boom.19 Many other academics have called for increased regulation of the 
shadow banking sector in order to ensure its stability;20 but few have 
focused on the role of consumer protection regulation as part of that new 
foundation.21 
II. A TALE OF TWO MORTGAGES22 
The following tale of two mortgages provides a good context for 
understanding the role of consumer protection in shadow banking 
regulation. One of my most striking memories from the height of the 
subprime boom involves a phone call from a reporter for the Wall Street 
Journal. He wanted me to comment on a particular type of high interest 
mortgage marketed by a national lender.  
The mortgage came with a two-year teaser cap on loan payments (not 
on the interest rate mind you—on the payments!). It also had a three-year 
prepayment penalty period. This can create a perfect storm for a borrower, 
particularly for an unsophisticated one. For once the artificially low 
payments of the two-year teaser period end, the borrower might find it 
difficult to make her payments on the loan.  
The mortgage also has a prepayment penalty. If the borrower tries to 
refinance from this high interest rate product to a more affordable one after 
the two-year teaser cap is lifted, she will be forced to pay a prepayment 
penalty. That is because the prepayment penalty period lasts for three years, 
a year longer than the teaser cap on payments. This scheme ensures that the 
lender wins—one way or another.  
Let us turn to another species of mortgage, Dodd-Frank’s “Qualified 
Mortgage” as well as its statutory sibling, the “Qualified Residential 
                                                                                                                 
the transformation process made it increasingly more difficult for investors to understand their risk 
exposure). 
 19. See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 2–3; see also Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 633.  
 20. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 640–42 (suggesting that regulation of shadow banking 
requires a holistic approach that would include several regulatory agencies coordinating to oversee 
banks, securities, and derivatives); Gorton & Metrick, supra note 5, at 284–85 (discussing how 
securitization, namely shadow banking, is merely another form of banking and therefore should be 
regulated in the same manner as bank functions). 
 21. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 9, for a discussion of how consumer abuses led to 
the subprime crisis. See Adam Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Georgetown 
Law Faculty Working Papers, Research Paper No. 1447082, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447082, for a discussion of the flaws of the pre-CFPB consumer 
financial protection regulatory structure. See Erik Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link 
Between Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 93 (2009), 
for a discussion of financial regulation in terms of the link between consumer protection and 
systemic risk.  
 22. This and the following section are based on my recent article for Boston University School 
of Law’s Shadow Banking symposium on February 24, 2012: David Reiss, Message in a 
Mortgage: What Dodd-Frank’s “Qualified Mortgage” Tells Us About Ourselves, 31 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 717 [hereinafter Reiss, Message in a Mortgage]. 
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Mortgage.”23 Dodd-Frank tries to reduce the risk of a systemic failure by 
regulating the quality of mortgages that are securitized by banks and 
shadow banks.24 The Qualified Mortgage is one that is privileged by Dodd-
Frank in order to incentivize lenders to originate them instead of other types 
of mortgages.25  
The Qualified Mortgage provides lenders with a safe harbor from 
certain provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as well as from 
Dodd-Frank’s mandatory “ability to repay” underwriting standards.26 The 
net effect of this component of Dodd-Frank is to create a kind of “plain 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 719–21 (footnote omitted). The definition for a “Qualified Residential Mortgage” 
can be no broader than the definition of a Qualified Mortgage. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1895 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2010)). 
 24. Dodd-Frank enacts enhanced supervision and prudential standards for nonbank financial 
companies for the following purpose: 
(1) PURPOSE.—In order to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the 
United States that could arise from the material financial distress, failure, or ongoing 
activities of large, interconnected financial institutions, the Council may make 
recommendations to the Board of Governors concerning the establishment and 
refinement of prudential standards and reporting and disclosure requirements applicable 
to nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors and large, 
interconnected bank holding companies, that— 
(A) are more stringent than those applicable to other nonbank financial companies and 
bank holding companies that do not present similar risks to the financial stability of the 
United States; and 
(B) increase in stringency, based on the considerations identified in subsection (b)(3). 
Dodd-Frank Act § 115(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1403 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5324). Cf. Bernard S. 
Sharfman, Using the Law to Reduce Systemic Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 609–10, 615 (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711927 (arguing that systemic risk should be reduced, but 
not eliminated, because it is a necessary byproduct of a successful economy). 
 25. See generally Dodd-Frank Act § 1412, 124 Stat. at 2145–48 (codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1639c(b)). The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the Bureau promulgate rules relating to Qualified 
Mortgages. Id.  
 26. Id. The “safe harbor” is a rebuttable presumption that a Qualified Mortgage meets section 
1411 of the Dodd-Frank Act’s “ability to repay” standards. Id. See generally id. § 1411(a)(2), 124 
Stat. at 2142 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)). Federal Housing Administration- (FHA) and 
other Government Sponsored Entity- (GSE) insured loans are exempt from the “skin in the game 
requirements.” See id. § 941(b), 124 Stat. at 1891–96 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 75o-11(c)(1)(G)(ii)) 
(requiring that several government agencies promulgate “a total or partial exemption” for FHA- 
and GSE-insured loans, thus excluding the loans from the “credit risk retention requirements”). 
 
The term “Qualified Residential Mortgage” delineates, on the other hand, 
which loans will be exempt from requirements that at least five percent of the credit risk 
be retained by the securitizer. While the [Qualified Mortgage] “ability to repay” 
obligation will apply to all residential mortgages, the [Qualified Residential Mortgage] 
definition will apply only to mortgages that are privately securitized. 
Robert G. Quercia et al., Balancing Risk and Access: Underwriting Standards for Qualified 
Residential Mortgages 2–3 (Mar. 5, 2012) (unpublished research report), available at 
http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/QRM%20Underwriting.3.2012.pdf. 
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vanilla” mortgage option that lenders will want to originate because it poses 
fewer regulatory and litigation risks.27  
This plain vanilla option is meant to crowd out a number of abusive 
practices that sprang up during the subprime boom. Although not labeled 
explicitly, the elements of the Qualified Mortgage definition are tied to 
notorious mortgage products.28 The first element bars negatively amortizing 
mortgages;29 the second bars liar loans;30 the third bars balloon payments, 
which protects borrowers from payment shock;31 the fourth bars 
underwriting based on teaser and adjustable interest rates, again to limit 
payment shock;32 the fifth bars equity-based lending;33 the sixth limits high 
points and fees to limit equity stripping;34 and the seventh limits mortgage 
terms to thirty years to reduce the likelihood of a borrower being caught in 
an endless cycle of debt.35 
III. THE ROAD AHEAD 
Can this new regulatory approach to shadow mortgage banking 
succeed? It does face a lot of challenges at both the origination level as well 
as the securitization level. It says that paternalism is appropriate in some 
                                                                                                                 
 27. John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175, 175–76 (2011). The definitions of 
Qualified Mortgage and Qualified Residential Mortgage bring back to life the “plain vanilla” 
mortgage option that had been heatedly debated before the Dodd-Frank Act was adopted but had 
been rejected in its original incarnation. Id.  
 28. Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, supra note 22, at 723.  
 29. Id.  
 30. See Joe Nocera, In Prison for Taking a Liar Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at B1 
(describing consumer convicted for fraud on applications for stated-income loans, the formal term 
for “liar loans”). 
 31. “Balloon payments” are loans where “monthly payments are lower but one large payment 
(the balloon payment) is due when the loan matures. Predatory loans may contain a balloon 
payment that the borrower is unlikely to be able to afford . . . . Sometimes, lenders market a low 
monthly payment without adequate disclosure of the balloon payment.” U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES 
FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 19 (2004) [hereinafter GAO, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION]. 
 32. “[P]ayment shock is the percentage increase (or decrease) in the monthly payment relative to 
the payment in the previous year.” Brent W. Ambrose et al., A Note on Hybrid Mortgages, 33 REAL 
EST. ECON. 765, 773 (2005).  
 33. “Equity-based lending” is a type of mortgage lending where “lenders make loans based on 
the amount of the homeowner’s equity, even if it may appear that the borrower has insufficient 
income to make monthly payments,” and often without regard for the borrower’s ability to repay 
the loan. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 337 (2005). 
 34. See GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 31 (“Mortgage originators may refinance 
borrowers’ loans repeatedly in a short period of time without any economic gain for the borrower. 
With each successive refinancing, these originators charge high fees that ‘strip’ borrowers’ equity 
in their homes.”).  
 35. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1412, 124 Stat. 1376, 2145–46 (2010) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(viii)). See Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, supra note 22, at 723–24, 
for a more detailed treatment. Qualified Mortgages also have a limitation on prepayment penalties. 
Dodd-Frank Act § 1414(a), 124 Stat. at 2149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)(4)). Qualified 
Mortgage prepayment penalties must be no greater than 3 percent and must phase out over a three-
year period. Id. This provision also reduces the opportunities for equity stripping.  
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contexts, it limits the flexibility of parties to modify a mortgage as 
compared to how society regulates goods and services generally, it may 
restrict credit needlessly, and it may be irrelevant. 
A. PATERNALISTIC 
It had long been the view among economists that consumer protection 
is paternalistic to the extent that consumers are rational.36 Behavioral 
economics has challenged this notion, demonstrating that consumers can 
behave in predictably irrational (and indeed, in some cases, in rationally 
ignorant) ways.37 The Subprime Bust has made paternalism much easier to 
swallow as a policy choice because so many market participants have made 
such spectacularly bad choices. Additionally, behavioral economics has 
provided a theoretical justification for paternalistic government policies in 
the mortgage markets that some had found lacking until recently.  
B. LIMITS FLEXIBILITY 
It is well established that rules-based regulation is less flexible than a 
standards-based approach or an unfettered market, for that matter. The 
definition of a Qualified Mortgage surely falls within the scope of rules-
based regulation, with its bars on numerous mortgage characteristics.38 The 
Dodd-Frank Act did, however, build significant regulatory flexibility into 
its regulation of mortgages. Dodd-Frank authorizes regulators to “prescribe 
regulations that revise, add to, or subtract from the criteria that define a 
qualified mortgage.”39 It remains to be seen whether regulators will be 
nimble enough to deploy such flexibility, but the option is certainly there. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15–17 (3d ed. 1986) (defending 
the assumption that people are rational). See generally Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for 
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1211 (2003) (discussing tension between paternalistic consumer regulation and self-
determination). Public choice theorists might characterize consumer protection regulation in even 
worse terms: it is the product of rent-seekers who hope to gain favorable regulations to benefit 
themselves and who may couch the regulations in consumer protection garb in order to make it 
more palatable politically. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) 
(setting forth a theory of public choice). 
 37. See generally Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (arguing that in certain situations, consumer behavior is contrary to 
economic theory). 
 38. Dodd-Frank Act § 1412, 124 Stat. at 2145–46 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)) (defining 
“Qualifying Mortgage”); see supra text accompanying note 35.  
 39. Dodd-Frank Act § 1412, 124 Stat. at 2148 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(B)); see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e) (allowing Federal banking agencies and the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to adopt exemptions, exceptions, and adjustments to “skin in the game” 
requirements). 
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C. RESTRICTS CREDIT 
Consumer advocates and real estate industry trade groups argue that 
strict underwriting criteria contained in the proposed Qualified Residential 
Mortgage definition will restrict credit to many who could benefit from it 
because of its high down payment requirements.40 Finding the right balance 
between responsible underwriting and access to credit is, of course, key. 
But again, Dodd-Frank has the flexibility to achieve that result. 
D. POSSIBLY IRRELEVANT 
The Qualified Mortgage and its statutory sibling, the Qualified 
Residential Mortgage, also face serious challenges in the secondary 
mortgage market. The Qualified Mortgage and Qualified Residential 
Mortgage definitions may be too narrow such that they will not crowd out 
less consumer-friendly mortgage products from the market.41 Alternatively, 
the definitions could be too broad such that they allow many risky mortgage 
products.42 Both paths could lead to a return to a mortgage market where 
abusive lending practices come back with a vengeance and pose systemic 
risk to the financial system. Finally, the definitions could be just so lousy 
that they could lead to a dormant mortgage market, with a concomitant 
catatonic housing market. Thus, a key question is whether the definitions 
achieve a sweet spot among the approaches that could be taken.43 
                                                                                                                 
 40. COAL. FOR SENSIBLE HOUS. POLICY, PROPOSED QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 
DEFINITION HARMS CREDITWORTHY BORROWERS WHILE FRUSTRATING HOUSING RECOVERY 1 
(2011), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation 
/regulators/Coalition-QRM-White-Paper-1.pdf. The Coalition argues that  
once you apply the strong underwriting standards in the sample QRM definition, 
moving from a 5 percent to a 10 percent down payment requirement reduces the overall 
default experience by an average of only two- to three-tenths of one percent for each 
cohort year. However, the increase in the minimum down payment from 5 percent to 10 
percent would eliminate from 4 to 7 percent of borrowers from qualifying for a lower 
rate QRM loan. 
Id. at 6.  
 41. Levitin et al., supra note 7, at 164. Many argue that narrow Qualified Mortgage and 
Qualified Residential Mortgage definitions will be detrimental to the growth of the mortgage 
market. See Quercia et al., supra note 26, at 6, 10, 27–29, 33–35 (arguing that stringent 
underwriting requirements for Qualified Mortgages will provide a small increase in foreclosure 
reduction at the cost of significant restrictions in credit access for low- to middle-income 
borrowers); see also Raymond Natter, Congressional Intent Regarding the Qualified Mortgage 
Provision, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 921, 923 (May 22, 2012) (discussing congressional concern 
that a narrow definition will result in unanticipated restrictions in “mortgage credit availability for 
traditional loans,” and that a narrow definition will prevent regulation from keeping up with 
financial products developed in the future). 
 42. Levitin et al., supra note 7, at 164. A related question is whether regulators can keep up 
with market participants as they attempt to circumvent the spirit of the regulations while 
complying with their letter. See infra note 66.  
 43. See Levitin et al., supra note 7, at 164. 
2012] Consumer Protection Out of the Shadows 139 
IV. THE BUREAU’S AGENDA 
The agenda of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the Bureau) 
has begun to take shape. The Bureau is the new agency created by Dodd-
Frank that has much of the authority over Dodd-Frank’s mortgage-related 
provisions.44 The Bureau’s Assistant Director for Regulations, Leonard N. 
Chanin, stated that the “bulk of the [B]ureau’s activities” in 2012 will be 
occupied by providing guidance regarding mortgage statutes and 
rulemaking.45 The most important initiatives will be finalizing the rules for 
Dodd-Frank’s “ability to repay” and Qualified Mortgages provisions.46 
Chanin also noted that “[p]retty much the entire mortgage arena as we know 
it will be covered by the rules . . . [and] a lot of future rule makings really 
hinge on the adoption of these rules because they are so broad in terms of 
the mortgage market.”47 
The Bureau’s agenda for residential mortgage regulation can be inferred 
from its various proposed rulemakings, requests for comments, and 
consumer initiatives. The Bureau is clearly focusing on broadly accepted 
forms of consumer protection, such as disclosure requirements and 
consumer education, that address information asymmetries in the financial 
markets. It is also promulgating paternalistic regulations that set up bright-
line rules for products and behavior in the mortgage market, and is 
complementing such regulations with closer supervision for formerly 
under-regulated mortgage market actors—the shadow mortgage banking 
sector. 
This Part will provide a brief overview of the Bureau’s activities thus 
far and its agenda for the immediate future with regard to home mortgage 
lending regulation.  
A. DISCLOSURE 
Disclosure requirements are designed to reduce information 
asymmetries between consumers and producers.48 Disclosure requirements 
are accepted across the political spectrum.49 Nonetheless, it is unclear how 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Dodd-Frank Act § 1400(b), 124 Stat. at 2136 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481) (naming the 
“Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act” as an enumerated consumer law which falls 
under the purview of the Bureau). 
 45. Stephen Joyce, Official: CFPB Will Exert Bulk of Rule-Writing Efforts in 2012 on 
Mortgage-Related Rules, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 136, 136 (Jan. 24, 2012). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See generally Camerer et al., supra note 36, at 1232–33 (discussing the value of disclosure 
requirements under the Federal Truth in Lending Act in order to give uneducated consumers the 
opportunity to make more informed decisions).  
 49. Id. (noting the ubiquity and benefits of disclosure in a consumer protection context). 
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effective disclosure requirements are and whether the Bureau’s efforts in 
this regard will be more successful than those that have come before.50 
The Bureau is working to increase transparency and the exchange of 
information between borrowers and lenders through two initiatives. First, 
the Bureau is developing a consolidated mortgage loan disclosures proposal 
to consolidate mortgage loan disclosures and related rules under TILA and 
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.51 As a part of the Bureau’s 
“Know Before You Owe” initiative, the Bureau will combine the TILA 
disclosure with the HUD-1 Settlement Statement that lenders give to 
consumers taking out loans to purchase a home or refinance a mortgage.52 
The Bureau is currently in the final rounds of testing and soliciting 
comments on their proposed Loan Estimate and Settlement Disclosure 
forms.53 
The Bureau is also proposing new rules relating to the servicing of 
mortgages.54 These proposals include requirements for clearer mortgage 
statements; clear warnings before the interest rates on adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs) adjust; options for avoiding lender-imposed “force-
placed” property insurance; and lender options for avoiding foreclosure.55 
The proposals also include requirements that mortgage payments be 
immediately credited; payment records be kept as up-to-date and as 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The 
Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006) (arguing that mandatory disclosure 
may be insufficient to overcome consumer decision-making heuristics). 
 51. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1032(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 2007 (2010) (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 5532 (2010)); see also Fall 2011 Statement of Regulatory Priorities, CFPB, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/fall-2011-statement-of-regulatory-priorities/ (last 
visited on Jan. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Regulatory Priorities]. 
 52. Press Release, CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes “Know Before You 
Owe” Mortgage Forms (July 9, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer 
-financial-protection-bureau-proposes-know-before-you-owe-mortgage-forms/. The HUD-1 “is a 
document that lists all charges and credits to the buyer and to the seller in a real estate 
settlement.”What is a HUD-1?, CFPB (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb 
/178/what-is-a-hud-1.html. 
 53. The CFPB Mortgage Disclosure Team, Know Before You Owe: The Last Dance . . . or Is 
It?, CFPB BLOG (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/. The Loan Estimate form 
is a disclosure form given to consumers detailing the loan terms, projected payments, closing cost 
details, comparisons with other loans, and other relevant considerations. See CFPB, LOAN 
ESTIMATE FORM (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/20120220_cfpb_tupelo-loan 
-estimate.pdf (providing sample Loan Estimate form). The Settlement Disclosure form is a 
statement of final loan terms and closing costs. CFPB, SETTLEMENT DISCLOSURE FORM (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/20120220_cfpb_basswood-settlement-disclosure.pdf 
(providing sample Settlement Disclosure form). 
 54. For a summary of the CFPB’s proposals in this area, see CFPB, PUTTING THE ‘SERVICE’ 
BACK IN MORTGAGE SERVICING: NO SURPRISE, NO RUNAROUNDS, (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_cfpb_factsheet_putting-service-back-in-mortgage 
-servicing.pdf [hereinafter NO SURPRISE]. For a more detailed description of the CFPB’s 
proposals, see CFPB, FINAL REPORT OF THE SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL ON CFPB’S 
PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR MORTGAGE SERVICING RULEMAKING (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201208_cfpb_SBREFA_Report.pdf. 
 55. See NO SURPRISE, supra note 54, at 2–3. 
2012] Consumer Protection Out of the Shadows 141 
accessible as possible given the size of the servicer; errors be corrected as 
quickly as possible; and foreclosure prevention teams be maintained by the 
servicer.56 
Finally, the Bureau is issuing, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, a monthly 
mortgage statement form,57 which is intended to assist consumers in 
appropriate budgeting.58 The form will include information about key 
current loan terms (principal amount and interest rate) and key information 
about the mortgage, such as the reset date for ARMs and the amount of any 
late or prepayment fees.59 Finally, it contains information about how to 
contact housing counselors if the homeowner is in financial distress.60 
It is encouraging to note that the Bureau is testing its new disclosure 
forms. But the Bureau has not yet made clear whether it will be testing them 
once they are adopted. Only ongoing testing will determine whether 
improved disclosures will actually have a systemic impact on consumer 
choices.61 
B. EDUCATION 
Some, including Bureau leadership, believe that financial education for 
consumers is key to consumer protection because better educated 
consumers make better informed loan decisions.62 Others are more 
skeptical.63 The Bureau provides mortgage payment and foreclosure 
prevention advice on its website.64 The Bureau’s website also provides 
referrals to local foreclosure prevention resources and specialized assistance 
for servicemen and veterans.65 As these measures are still in their infancy, 
the jury is still out as to whether these education efforts will improve 
outcomes for individuals and the financial system. As with the disclosure 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See id. at 3–4.  
 57. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1420, 124 Stat. 1376, 2156 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1638 (2010)). 
 58. See Whitney Patross, A Model Form for Mortgage Statements, CFPB BLOG (Feb. 13, 
2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/. The CFPB has created a prototype Mortgage 
Statement form. CFPB, DRAFT PERIODIC MORTGAGE STATEMENT (2012), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/20120213_cfpb_draft-periodic-mortgage-statement.pdf.  
 59. See Patross, supra note 58.  
 60. See id.  
 61. See generally Willis, supra note 50.  
 62. See, e.g., CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 19 (2011), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf (“This division provides, through 
a variety of initiatives and methods, information to consumers that will allow them to make the 
decisions that are best for them. Consumer education is a central mission of the Bureau.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 
201 (2008) (“The gulf between the literacy levels of most Americans and that required to assess 
the plethora of credit, insurance, and investment products sold today—and new products as they 
are invented tomorrow—realistically will not be bridged.”). 
 64. Mortgage Help, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/mortgagehelp/ (last visited Aug. 
30, 2012). 
 65. Id. 
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initiatives described above, ongoing empirical testing will be key to 
demonstrating the impact of the Bureau’s consumer education initiatives. 
C. BRIGHT-LINE RULES AND INCREASED SUPERVISION 
Government-run consumer protection regimes premised on bright-line 
rules are vulnerable to evasion by nimble, profit-maximizing private sector 
actors.66 Nonetheless, many of the worst excesses of the Subprime Boom 
arose from a small number of underwriting innovations, such as “equity 
based lending” and “liar loans.”67 Dodd-Frank, as implemented by the 
Bureau, bans some of the worst of these “innovations” and incentivizes the 
private sector to use some of the others much less frequently than they did 
during the Boom.68 As with the disclosure and education initiatives, it 
remains to be seen how effective this approach will be. 
One of the most important tasks for the Bureau in this regard is to 
finalize the hotly debated definitions for Qualified Mortgages and Qualified 
Residential Mortgages discussed above.69 The Bureau’s regulatory authority 
has extended from supervision of banking institutions to now include 
nonbanks as well.70 The Bureau will assess whether nonbanks are in 
violation of federal consumer financial laws, including TILA and the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).71 This will be accomplished by employing 
“a risk-based nonbank supervision program” that focuses on “risks posed to 
consumers.”72 The Bureau has issued a proposal for public comment73 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See Eric Posner & Richard Hynes, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. 
LAW & ECON. REV. 168, 197–98 (2002) (“[I]t is not clear how much the law would influence the 
behavior of even a rational, well-informed consumer, given the many loopholes, the limited 
penalty structures, and the many ways in which creditors can evade the law and creditors and 
debtors can contract around it.”). 
 67. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 9, at 35–38.   
 68. See Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, supra note 22, at 722–24 (explaining how the Dodd-
Frank Act’s “Qualified Mortgage” and “Qualified Residential Mortgage” options incentivize 
lenders to choose a “plain vanilla” type mortgage that exposes them to fewer regulatory and 
litigation risks by abstaining from certain abusive lending practices that were popular leading up 
to the Subprime Boom).  
 69. See Regulatory Priorities, supra note 51.  
 70. Peggy Twohig & Steve Antonakes, The CFPB Launches its Nonbank Supervision 
Program, CFPB BLOG, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/the-cfpb-launches-its-nonbank 
-supervision-program/ (“[T]he CFPB has authority to oversee nonbank businesses, regardless of 
size, in certain markets: mortgage companies (originators, brokers, and servicers, and loan 
modification or foreclosure relief services); payday lenders; and private education lenders.”).  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  
[N]onbank examination will be the same as [the CFPB’s] approach to bank 
examination. It may include a combination of any of the following tools: requiring 
nonbanks to file certain reports, reviewing the materials the companies actually use to 
offer those products and services, reviewing their compliance systems and procedures, 
and reviewing what they promised consumers. 
Id.  
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describing procedures that will allow it to “notify a nonbank firm that it is 
being considered for supervision because the [B]ureau ‘may have 
reasonable cause’ to determine that the financial products or services 
offered pose risks to consumers.”74 While these notifications do not 
constitute charges for an alleged consumer protection violation, they are a 
way for the Bureau to reach nonbanks and notify them that they are being 
individually supervised by the Bureau.75 
The Bureau has also expanded its regulatory scope by issuing notices to 
the mortgage loan industry regarding regulation and advised practices. For 
example, Director Cordray has stated that the Bureau will apply the 
disparate impact doctrine, or “effects test,” when enforcing the ECOA.76 
Finally, the Bureau has acknowledged that flexibility is essential to a 
properly functioning market. This doctrine is reflected in the Bureau’s 
efforts to address concerns particular to nonbank and smaller banking 
entities.77 It has also manifested a sensitivity to concerns about over-
regulation. This has been seen in its willingness to adapt to changing market 
realities, as evinced in the Bureau’s final regulations regarding Home 
Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C).78 
As noted above, the Bureau has to walk a fine line between protecting 
consumers from poor choices on the one hand and limiting consumer choice 
on the other.79 If it goes too far in one direction, it can reduce access to 
credit. If it goes too far in the other, it can leave consumers to fend for 
themselves against rapacious lenders in a predatory market. The stakes for 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Procedural Rules to Establish Supervisory Authority over Certain Nonbank Covered 
Persons Based on Risk Determination, 77 Fed. Reg. 31,226 (May 25, 2012) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1091). 
 74. Mike Ferullo, Consumer Bureau Lays out Procedures for Notifying Nonbank Firms of 
Supervision, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 941, 941 (May 29, 2012). 
 75. See id.  
 76. Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Keynote Address at the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared 
-remarks-by-richard-cordray/; see also CFPB, CFPB BULL. 2012-04 (FAIR LENDING): LENDING 
DISCRIMINATION 1, 2 (2012) (discussing the applicability of disparate impact doctrine, also 
known as the “effects test,” to enforce compliance with ECOA).  
 77. Community Banks and Credit Unions, CFPB (2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov 
/small-financial-services-providers/. The Bureau has established an Office for Community Banks 
and Credit Unions “to ensure that the Bureau incorporates the perspectives of small depository 
institutions into our policy-making process; to communicate relevant policy initiatives to 
community banks and credit unions; and to work with community banks and credit unions to 
identify potential areas for regulatory simplification.” Id. 
 78. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003 (2012). For example, Regulation C provides that the asset threshold 
for an entity to be considered a “financial institution” fluctuates annually. Id. § 1003.2 (defining 
the term “financial institution”). Based on the most recent threshold, mortgage lenders in 
metropolitan areas with assets of $41 million or less are exempt from the requirement to collect 
data about their housing-related lending activities in 2012. Home Mortgage Disclosure 
(Regulation C), 77 Fed. Reg. 8721, 9722 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003, 
app. B).  
 79. See supra at Parts IV.A–C. 
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homeowners and the housing sector are as high as can be.80 But the broader 
impact is also of great consequence, given the role that housing and 
residential construction play in the overall economy.81 
CONCLUSION 
While the initial signals are positive, the jury is still out on how 
effective the Dodd-Frank consumer protection regime, as implemented by 
the Bureau, will be in protecting homeowners and promoting a vibrant 
market for residential mortgages. A preliminary evaluation indicates that 
the Bureau is balancing increased regulation with regulatory flexibility, 
implicitly acknowledging that such flexibility is necessary for a properly 
functioning market. Such an approach bodes well for consumers. As such, it 
may also bode well for a reduction in systemic risk in this sector of the 
financial industry—the sector that gave us the Subprime Crisis. This is 
because that crisis demonstrated that a large sector of the consumer 
economy can go off the rails for quite some time before the financial 
markets take note.82 To the extent that consumer protection regulation keeps 
a sector from doing so, it can reduce systemic risk.  
The role of consumer protection should always be front and center in 
discussions of shadow mortgage banking regulation. It is essential to 
healthy markets for the origination and securitization of residential 
mortgages, and it is essential to the legitimacy and functioning of the 
financial system overall. And, as past experience has shown, we leave it in 
the shadows at our peril. 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See generally ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 9, at 15–42 (discussing the “emergence of the 
subprime market”). 
 81. See generally id. at 99–122 (discussing the financial “meltdown” that occurred from 2008–
2009).  
 82. See generally id.  
